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Introduction
The concept of a ‘Healthy Welfare Card’, now renamed as 
the Cashless Debit Card (CDC), was a recommendation 
of the Forrest Review into Employment and Training 
(Forrest 2014). It was seen as a development from 
income management which has been occurring in parts 
of Australia since the Northern Territory Emergency 
Response, when it was first introduced for Aboriginal 
communities there. The CDC appears to operate a little 
differently from the Basics Card1 used in the Northern 
Territory income management program. The CDC is 
a debit card which can be used for any purchases 
excluding certain forms of gambling, drugs and alcohol. 
Unlike the Basics Card, which prohibits purchase of a 
similar range of goods and services but can only be used 
in registered stores, the CDC is meant to be acceptable 
to any retailer for all purchases other than the prohibited 
categories. Trials of the CDC began in Ceduna region 
(South Australia) on 15 March 2016, and in the East 
Kimberley region (Western Australia) on 26 April 2016. All 
working age income support payment recipients receive 
80% of their payments through the card. In March 2017 
the Department of Social Services released a ‘Wave 1’ 
evaluation undertaken by Orima Research of the CDC 
trials in Ceduna and Kununurra (Orima 2017). This paper 
reviews this Evaluation Report. 
The Evaluation Report has several sections, including 
one that looks at whether the Key Performance Indicators 
(KPIs) have been achieved, as well as a longer section 
that considers some broader evaluation questions. 
The five Appendices include a great deal more detailed 
data from participant interviews and focus groups with 
community leaders and stakeholders. There is some rich 
information in the qualitative reports and additional data 
but not all of it that might be relevant finds its way into the 
interpretation of some of the quantitative data presented. 
In this review I have tried to draw on some of this material 
to interpret some of the quantitative results. There is more 
one could do with that rich data, which raises as many 
questions as it answers.
The structure of this paper is as follows. First it outlines 
the evaluation methods Orima used and provides some 
comments. Then it follows the Orima Report’s structure 
and examines the evaluation’s findings in relation to the 
KPIs for the program. There are output and outcome 
KPIs which the evaluation reports on. The next section of 
this paper examines the evaluation’s response to some 
broader evaluation questions. There is some inevitable 
overlap between the reporting against the outcome 
KPIs and the Wave 1 evaluation’s reporting against the 
broader evaluation questions. Following this, the paper 
makes reference to some additional data in the many 
appendices which deserves mention. The paper finishes 
by reframing the Evaluation Report’s conclusions and 
reflecting on the relationship between evaluation and 
policy making in this complex space.
The evaluation methods
The evaluation uses three different sources of 
information:
• administrative data, such as Centrelink payment data 
and other information from government departments
• interviews and focus group sessions with a total of 73 
community leaders and stakeholders in the sites, 85% 
of the latter being non-Indigenous (which is referred to 
as the qualitative research), and
• interviews with trial participants (only 9% of whom 
were non-Indigenous), family members of participants 
and other community members residing in the regions 
(referred to as the quantitative survey). An ‘intercept 
sampling’ method was used by interviewers at key 
locations in the communities.
The evaluation was conducted in August 2016 in the 
Ceduna area and in September/early October 2016 in the 
Kimberley (Orima 2017:4–5).
The trial participants and the evaluation sample
The Evaluation Report does not give any information 
at the outset about the actual numbers of participants 
in the trial at each site. That information is in the Initial 
Conditions Report which shows that 757 Ceduna and 
1247 East Kimberley residents had received income 
support payments through a CDC by 4 October 2016 
(Orima, n.d.:13). The CDC was applied to all working 
age income support recipients, while those on Age or 
Veteran pensions or working can voluntarily join the 
program.2 In Ceduna, 45% of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander residents had a CDC, and only 6% non-
Indigenous residents; while in East Kimberley, 49% of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander residents and 10% 
of non-Indigenous residents had a CDC.3 Evaluations 
of income management have shown rather different 
results for the compulsory participants compared to 
results for voluntary participants (Bray 2016). Clearly, 
although there was a possibility of opting to join the trial 
few had, so that the vast majority of participants are 
compulsorily on the CDC4. It would have been useful if 
basic information about the numbers on the trials at the 
time of the evaluation had been included in the main text 
of this report.
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Some graphics in the Evaluation Report are hard to 
comprehend precisely – in relation to the total sample 
of 552 participants in the evaluation, and 78 family 
members, as well as 110 non-participant local people 
sampled (Orima 2017:16) – but it appears that the sample 
of participants was 91% Indigenous and predominantly 
women (63%) rather than men (37%). At at least in the 
case of Ceduna, 43% of the non-participants surveyed 
did not live in the Ceduna area. 
Overall the methodology of the study raises many issues. 
We are told that the results were weighted to reflect the 
age, gender and Indigenous status of the total number 
of CDC trial participants in the two regions. Despite the 
number of evaluation respondents being far greater in the 
East Kimberley (454) than in Ceduna (286), the weighting 
ensured the two sites were treated as if their numbers 
were equal, thus giving greater weight to the responses 
from Ceduna over those from East Kimberley. There is 
no explanation given for this weighting decision. The 
evaluation also relies on subjective perceptions without 
adequate triangulation with other sources. The lack of 
adequate baseline data on the outcome measures makes 
real assessment of change difficult. In addition the results 
in many cases reflect quite small numbers of people and 
may not be statistically significant5. One small example 
of the methodological problems is on page E1, where a 
footnote says that ‘Some participants in the evaluation 
who were not interviewed for the Initial Conditions Report 
completed a questionnaire retrospectively’ and this 
retrospective data was included in the average rating 
on ‘Issues in the local community’. Such retrospective 
data is likely to be influenced by recall bias. This is poor 
evaluation practice.
The ‘intercept’ system for interviewing was to locate 
interviewers at sites of high pedestrian traffic (in front of 
shops, for example) and approach every ‘nth’ person6. 
Many were screened out presumably because they were 
neither participants, nor family members, and there 
was a much higher number of refusals (almost equal to 
participants) in Kununurra than in Ceduna. There is no 
comment on what this might mean for the nature of the 
final sample. In addition there were interviews with ‘key 
stakeholders’ and community leaders. None of the survey 
instruments used are made available for review in this 
report, which would have been useful for assessing the 
questions themselves. 
Evaluation findings in relation to 
the Key Performance Indicators
We are told that the trials had a number of output 
KPIs which were largely achieved. That is, participants 
received their cards, started using them in a timely way, 
and 80% of their income was quarantined for use on 
these cards (i.e. only 20% of their income was provided 
in cash). Community leaders who were interviewed 
continued to support the trials. Some KPIs were partially 
achieved, such as people understanding the constraints 
on the card usage, while not necessarily knowing what to 
do in certain circumstances (e.g. loss of card [897 cards 
were lost, pA6], or how to find out the balance on the 
card). There is no mention of the problems that lost cards 
may have caused participants, nor how quickly they were 
replaced. Some 78% reported that they had not changed 
‘where and how they shopped’ (p18) since going on 
the card but 18% (almost one in five) had encountered 
difficulties accessing some allowable things they 
wanted to purchase using the card. On pB7 we find that 
altogether 46% of participants had experienced problems 
using their card.
The outcome KPIs are more important, particularly if 
there were measurable targets for behavioural changes 
– however these are not specifically identified. It is 
necessary to scan the Initial Conditions Report (Orima 
n.d.) to find these together on pps.A11–19, or search 
through a lengthy Appendix A of this report to find them. 
It would have been useful had these been summarised in 
the body of the Wave 1 Evaluation Report (Orima 2017).
The first outcome KPI obviously related to alcohol 
consumption: 24% of participants thought alcohol 
consumption had reduced in the community, while 
25% reported that their own drinking had reduced (7% 
reported that alcohol use generally had increased). A 
higher proportion of community members (41%) thought 
alcohol use had reduced. However, what is not clear is 
whether these perceptions are accurate. They may be, 
as there is evidence of reduced alcohol purchase from 
the Kununurra bottle shop, but the question is whether 
the cause of any actual reduction is the CDC or alcohol 
restrictions introduced in Ceduna in 2015, and takeaway 
alcohol management and other restrictions operating in 
the East Kimberley (pC12).7 Some Ceduna community 
leaders interviewed felt that the alcohol restrictions may 
have had a very significant impact as they had noticed no 
further changes since the start of the Trial (pC1). A Review 
of the Takeaway Alcohol Management System (TAMS) 
trial in the East Kimberley, covering the period January–
October 2016, reports that ‘many people could not 
separate TAMS from the broader welfare reform agenda’ 
caepr.anu.edu.au
(Codeswitch 2016:13) referring to the CDC; thus the TAMS 
review recognises the problem of attribution which the 
CDC evaluation glosses over. So attribution is a problem, 
as is such a diversity of perceptions. One would think that 
if there had been a change it would be perceived with a 
degree of consistency across the community, not just by 
a minority of 24% (and this applies to other areas where 
perceptions varied greatly).
In relation to drug use, 24% reported less illegal drug use 
than before the start of the trial. Reliability of data and 
reported behaviour about illegal activity is always hard to 
judge. It may be that people are likely to report what they 
think the interviewer wants to hear in such cases. Further 
information which is provided later in the report reinforces 
how difficult it is to get reliable data on drug use.
In relation to gambling, 32% of participants reported 
gambling less and only a handful reported gambling 
more. In this case, some more interesting data is that 
poker machine revenue was 15% down on the same 
period in 2015 in the six months of the trial in Ceduna, 
which may verify these perceptions. However there is 
no consideration of whether there may be other reasons 
for this drop in gambling revenue. It is simply assumed 
that it results from the CDC trial, yet a graph on pA40 
shows gambling revenue in the Ceduna region fluctuating 
considerably month by month both before and after 
the trial. Furthermore, data for South Australia shows 
revenue from poker machines dropping in Ceduna Local 
Government Area (LGA) and across the State over at 
least a five-year period, making it very unclear what the 
CDC is contributing.8 There are no poker machines in the 
East Kimberley trial regions, so this poker machine use 
measure is irrelevant there (pC12). 
Other indicators related to whether people were aware 
of various support services available, such as drug and 
alcohol services, financial management support etc. 
The levels of awareness were about double the levels of 
actual use in both East Kimberley and Ceduna.
Responses to the broader evaluation questions
 On page 21 of the Wave 1 Evaluation Report (Orima 
2017) we are provided with the key questions the 
evaluation was to answer:
1. What have been the effects of the CDCT [Cashless 
Debit Card Trial] on program participants, their families 
and the broader community?
• Have there been reductions in the consumption of 
alcohol, illegal drug use, or gambling?
• Has there been a reduction in crime, violence and 
harm related to these behaviours?
• Has there been an increase in perceptions of safety in 
the Trial locations?
• Have there been any other positive impacts (e.g. 
increase in self-reported well-being, reduction in 
financial stress)?
2. Have there been any circumvention behaviours (e.g. 
participants selling goods purchased with cashless debit 
cards to obtain more cash, increase in humbugging 
or theft) that have undermined the effectiveness of 
the CDCT?
3. Have there been any other unintended adverse 
consequences (e.g. feelings of shame, social exclusion)?
4. What lessons can be learnt throughout the Trial to 
improve delivery and to inform future policy?
• How do effects differ among different groups of 
participants (e.g. men compared to women, people 
from different age groups)?
• Where has the Trial worked most and 
least successfully?
• To what extent can any changes be attributed to 
the Trial as opposed to external factor such as 
alcohol restrictions?
• Can the contribution of the debit card be 
distinguished from that of the additional services 
in the Trial locations provided via the CDCT 
support package?
Question 4 has not been answered in this Wave 1 
Evaluation Report and is expected to be answered later in 
the reporting framework, with the exception of the fourth 
dot point above. Since the additional services had barely 
commenced at the time of the Wave 1 Evaluation Report, 
the evaluation would be able to conclude that any effects 
were related to the CDC itself, not the additional services. 
Why other issues of attribution are not discussed in 
this Wave 1 Evaluation Report is unclear. There is some 
repetition of data used to assess KPI performance in this 
section of the Orima Report (2017).
Have there been reductions in the consumption 
of alcohol, illegal drug use, or gambling?
According to the report, 22% of participants reported 
reduction in at least one of the three ‘evils’, but notably 
34% said they did not practise any of those behaviours 
before the trial and 43% reported no change. Thus for 
77% of participants there has been no positive impact 
of the trial. Matters to do with alcohol consumption have 
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been largely covered above. The evaluation reports 
that perceptions of less alcohol consumption may have 
been affected by the season as cold weather would 
drive people indoors. There were indications that illegal 
drug use had reduced slightly but community leaders 
in Ceduna did not think there had been any change, 
whereas Kimberley community leaders thought there had 
been some improvement. One would expect if there were 
program effects on the drug use, they might be similar in 
the two locations, suggesting that other factors may also 
be in play.
There were minimal positive impacts of the CDC on drug 
use identified by stakeholders. In Ceduna,
concern about methamphetamines (‘ice’) had 
significantly heightened among the stakeholders 
compared to when they were interviewed at the 
Initial Conditions stage of the research (i.e. in April 
2016). Most stakeholders consistently reported ice as 
being more prominent and easily available at Wave 
1 compared to the Initial Conditions stage. (Orima 
2017:pC2)
As ‘ice’ is relatively low cost, it was thought that the CDC 
would not prevent its use, and there was a suspicion 
from health workers that marijuana is being laced with 
ice to generate addiction. Furthermore, ‘ambulance 
presentations demonstrated that there hasn’t been a 
significant change in marijuana and other drug use’ 
(Orima 2017:pC3).
In relation to gambling, poker machines were only 
available in Ceduna, and people were unable to comment 
on online or informal gambling which may continue as 
before, although there was anecdotal evidence of some 
slight reductions. Whether card games, for example, had 
simply gone into less public places is hard to know. The 
question to participants regarding reduction in gambling 
related to their spending $50/day or more on gambling, 
which would certainly be difficult to do on 20% of a 
welfare payment; 27% said they had done this less since 
the start of the trial, which could mean they spent less 
on gambling, but still participated in it. So the question 
is whether the trial is really about reducing gambling, or 
gambling expenditure, or both?
Has there been a reduction in crime, violence 
and harm related to these behaviours?
Police crime statistics are ambivalent on this – there has 
been no decline in crime overall in the East Kimberley 
and a suggestion that more children are stealing money 
there. However, some stakeholders mentioned a 
decrease in Automated Teller Machine (ATM) vandalism 
(this could have been double-checked with the banks) 
and a reduced number of injuries indicative of domestic 
violence. Overall perceptions of reduced crime were 
mixed, and the same was true in relation to whether 
perceptions of safety had improved. 
Stakeholders in Ceduna, ‘identified some increase in 
domestic violence/intervention orders –although it was 
not clear whether this was due to changes in reporting 
requirements or increased community awareness, 
understanding and willingness to take action’ (Orima 
2017:pC3), or the CDC.
Ceduna community interviewees also noted that 
ambulance call-outs to public places had reduced, but to 
private locations had increased, suggesting only that the 
location of anti-social behaviours had perhaps changed. 
Thus the outcomes in this area seem quite limited at 
this stage.
Have there been any other positive impacts?
There is the question of whether there have been any 
other positive impacts, such as an increase in self-
reported wellbeing, or reduction in financial stress. 
According to the Wave 1 Evaluation Report, community 
leaders believe that there have been some other positive 
benefits, including in participants’ financial abilities 
(such as ability to pay bills or buy household items) as 
well as in nutrition and general wellbeing. However, this 
data has to be treated with some caution as we are 
told that community leaders wanted the trial in the first 
place. They may therefore be more likely to perceive that 
positive change has occurred. However, some anecdotal 
examples from other stakeholders seem to substantiate 
these perceptions at least to some degree, and the 
participant survey suggests that 31% of participants had 
been able to save more, and for those 46% with children, 
31% of these said they were better able to care for 
them. This may indicate that the trial is working for these 
participants. However, since participants knew that this 
was the intent of the trial there is a risk in such a survey 
that they would be inclined to say things had improved. 
Such common social science methodological problems 
are not discussed in the interpretation of the findings. Nor 
can an evaluation explore whether alternative programs 
of financial literacy education and savings clubs might 
have achieved a similar outcome for the longer term. The 
results in terms of whether ‘humbugging’ had reduced 
are also ambivalent – some participants think it has, 
others, particularly non-participants who may have more 
access to cash (and perhaps were the targets of the 
humbugging), think it has got worse. 
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The most significant finding is this: 
Amongst family members, 27% said the Trial had 
made their family’s life better and 37% that it had 
made it worse (net –10pp, see Figure 12). Across 
participants interviewed, 22% said it had made their 
lives better and 49% that it had made their lives 
worse (net change –26pp). These figures were fairly 
consistent across the two Trial sites (Orima 2017:34). 
That almost half the participants felt that the trial had 
made their lives worse is a worrying result, particularly 
given the rather limited substantiated positive results 
to date. Though we can welcome the fact that 22% felt 
their lives were better, the question is, at what cost? Is 
it acceptable for public policy to make more than twice 
as many participants’ lives worse in order that 22% 
can say their lives are better? Calculating a so-called 
‘net’ improvement is hardly valid when we are talking 
about different participants and their families who are 
experiencing real outcomes. 
The reason people felt their lives were worse related 
to ‘Not being able to spend money on things you need 
to (e.g. bills, appointments) or want (e.g. personal 
items)’. These sorts of problems may have significant 
consequences for people’s health or ability to retain 
services. Other reasons given were ‘Not being able to 
send money to kids/family/friends or buy them presents/
go on excursions (e.g. the show)’ (Orima 2017:p36) which 
can mean children feel socially excluded, and ‘Not being 
able to see how much money you have’ (Orima 2017:p36) 
and related money management problems. People living 
on very low incomes have to be careful money managers 
to survive so making this difficult is not helpful. Of non-
participants who said the trial had made their lives worse, 
the most common reason was to do with a perception of 
increased stealing and humbugging.
The evaluation found at least eight ways in which 
participants can circumvent the CDC restrictions, but it 
is unclear how widely these are being used, and it would 
be difficult for any evaluator to find out precisely. At the 
same time it found a number of problems for people 
wanting to use the cards in perfectly reasonable ways. 
For example, transferring money to children at boarding 
schools; making second hand purchases or buying 
where the seller has no Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) 
facility, making small payments like swimming pool 
entry, retailers outside the trial areas not accepting the 
card, and problems making automatic payments. While 
some of these actions should apparently be possible, 
in practice, people have problems with the CDC in 
such matters.
After reporting these very mixed findings the conclusions 
are rather surprising – that the trials have met the KPIs 
and, ‘In particular the Trial has been effective in reducing 
alcohol consumption, illegal drug use and gambling – 
establishing a clear “proof-of-concept”’ (Orima 2017:p46). 
It does acknowledge little impact on crime and safety 
but suggests that it is because it is too soon to see 
such outcomes yet, which may be true. Furthermore, it 
provides some evidence and draws conclusions that the 
positive changes that have occurred can be attributed to 
the CDC rather than other services that have been put in 
place. Since these new services had not been operating 
for very long at the time of the evaluation on that point 
the evaluation is correct but what it fails to consider is 
that changes may be attributable to other factors entirely, 
such as the alcohol restrictions, for example. In future 
evaluations the ability to differentiate the effect of the 
CDC from the service provision or any other factor will be 
even more difficult.
Data in Appendices not discussed
Whilst much in the Appendices provides the detailed 
results behind the evaluation’s more summary findings, 
there is material within them that appears not to have 
been highlighted or linked to the interview data and that 
might have provided important insights. Some of these 
have already been mentioned above where reference 
to Appendices is made in reviewing the evaluation’s 
findings. But there are other issues. 
For example, data is provided which shows that 55% of 
transactions on the cards failed due to insufficient funds 
(Orima 2017: pA6). That is nearly 21,000 transactions, 
where people were unable to purchase what they wanted. 
However, only 1% of failed transactions related to trying 
to use the card for prohibited purchases. This indicates 
some hardships and poverty and/or the problem that 
people did not know what their card balance was, 
indicating the challenge of money management using this 
card. Another reported problem related to the need to 
access phones and internet to find card balances, which 
can cause many problems for those without phones, 
phone credit, internet access, or not being in a mobile 
phone or internet server area.
According to the Wave 1 Evaluation Report, stakeholders 
also identified a range of needs in Ceduna and the 
surrounding remote communities (Orima 2017:pC7):
• Diversionary programs to provide more opportunity 
and activities
• Financial counselling
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• Domestic violence services including safe houses and 
community education
• Mental health
• Homeless/transitional accommodation – including for 
those entering and leaving rehabilitation clinics
• Programs for men
• Programs for 8–12 year olds
• Support services that are located / based in remote 
communities and not just in Ceduna. 
Stakeholders identified the following service needs in the 
East Kimberley (Orima 2017:pC19):
• Mental health
• Youth programs (including diversion and support), 
especially for ages 9–16
• Diagnosis of Foetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorders 
(FASD)
• Staffing of Wyndham services
• Transitional accommodation and holistic support to 
assist people leaving rehabilitation to re-enter the 
community and maintain changes in their behaviour
• Rehabilitation – stakeholders reported that this 
service was only available in Wyndham, not Kununurra
• Diversionary programs
• Employment programs.
Whilst some of these may be developed in association 
with the CDC trial, it seems strange that services were 
not provided before the CDC was rolled out across all 
working age income support payment recipients, at least 
some of whom did not drink, use drugs or gamble before 
the trials began.
It also seems that major problems of housing and 
unemployment in both locations showed no improvement 
as a result of the trials. This is hardly surprising as the 
trials were not designed to solve these problems – yet 
arguably, addressing these problems may be essential to 
improving a raft of social outcomes in both locations.
Conclusion and reflections
This takes me back to the purpose of the trials, which 
were ‘aimed at finding an effective tool for supporting 
disadvantaged communities to reduce the consumption 
and effects of drugs, alcohol and gambling that impact 
on the health and wellbeing of communities, families 
and children’9. Whilst these are worthy goals, the issue 
that arises is the contexts in which these goals are being 
pursued. Both Ceduna and the East Kimberley have 
major social and economic problems which are complex, 
and have resulted from a range of historical factors as 
well as contemporary policies. It seems extremely naïve 
to think that controlling people’s income to the degree 
now happening in these trials will be the solution to 
these complex problems. It is ‘silver bullet’ thinking to 
believe that these simple policy changes, which bring 
government increasingly into the everyday lives of 
welfare recipients and reduce their own capacities to 
control their lives, will solve the challenges they face. 
The lists of service needs from the stakeholders in 
each location illustrate the many challenges they are 
facing. The opportunity costs of undertaking CDC trials 
rather than using all available funds to provide some of 
these much-needed services has to be justified, even 
acknowledging that some effort to improve services is 
underway. Government resources are finite and the funds 
dispersed in operating the CDC could instead be spent 
on a much-needed service.
Clearly, the trials have longer to run and more 
improvements may eventuate. But the costs and benefits 
must be clearer – we have no information about the total 
budget costs for these trials10, nor the financial costs 
per participant. Nor can we discount the real costs for 
participants for whom the trials seem totally unnecessary 
as they have never participated in the targeted anti-social 
behaviours, or those for whom the trials have achieved 
no change or only negative changes in their lives, which 
is the majority of participants according to the Wave 1 
Evaluation Report.
Finally, the Commonwealth Government was quick 
to highlight the conclusions of the Wave 1 Evaluation 
Report. Yet a more thorough reading of the Report leads 
to significantly different framing of the conclusions:
• there has been reduction in alcohol use, but it is 
hard to identify whether this was attributable to the 
CDC trial or alcohol restrictions in both locations, 
particularly TAMS in the East Kimberley
• there have possibly been reductions in illegal drug use 
although there is little hard evidence; there is concern 
about increasing access to ‘ice’ and its relative low 
cost, particularly in Ceduna
• some evidence exists that poker machine income had 
dropped in Ceduna, but there is no discussion of any 
other factors that may have caused this, particularly 
given fluctuations evident before and after the trial 
commenced and a statewide reduction trend
caepr.anu.edu.au
• in relation to other forms of gambling it is hard make 
assessments – some public gambling may have 
moved to private venues and expenditure on gambling 
may have reduced
• some survey and anecdotal evidence indicates that 
people are spending more on household items and 
various other positive expenditures, but there is no 
ability to track that from store sales data, so it is hard 
to quantify and verify
• three-quarters of all participants said that the CDC 
has made no positive change to their lives and almost 
half of all participants said it had made their lives 
worse; only one-fifth of participants said it had made 
their lives better. 
Public policy is not well served by research and 
evaluation which is not nuanced and data which is not 
carefully interpreted. Politicians are busy and do not 
always focus on anything but the conclusions; and if 
those conclusions are what they want to hear they may 
well look no further. In this case, the Minister announced 
that he will extend the program indefinitely (Tudge & 
Porter 2017). This seems to be a very premature decision 
as the evaluation process will not be completed until June 
2017 (Orima 2017:1). The Minister also seems open to 
expanding the program’s coverage in due course (Tudge 
2017). But this decision may be a mistake as it may lead 
to poor public policy and bad public expenditure. 
If the CDC is helping some participants that is a good 
thing, but for most it is apparently making no difference 
or making their lives worse. Perhaps the critical evaluation 
question that needs to be asked is ‘which people is 
it useful for, and exactly how is it helping them?’ And 
perhaps for these people the card would be even more 
effective with so-called ‘wrap around services’ added 
to help them make longer-term changes in their lives. If 
it really is helpful for some, then the program should be 
targeted at those whose behaviours demonstrate they 
need it, and those who feel the program will assist them 
in the short term. Others who are not in any need of the 
CDC, and those for whom it is making no difference 
or making their lives worse may well benefit from quite 
different programs to improve their socioeconomic 
conditions. Furthermore the question remains, how 
long will people be left on this card? In the Northern 
Territory some have been on income management 
for almost a decade already. What is the pathway off 
income management?
There is an also an opportunity cost to any program. 
If these trials are not helping people who live in 
considerable poverty and a different program could, then 
change is required. Positive programs and services to 
address the problems, including housing and job creation 
that could make many more people’s lives better (Klein 
2017), may offer far greater value for public funds than the 
CDC program and do more to improve Indigenous lives. 
The wider public deserves to know how the costs and 
benefits of programs stack up. We cannot make a final 
assessment of these trials from this inadequate Wave 1 
Evaluation Report, but it raises many questions which the 
final evaluation report will need to answer, if it can (Cox 
2015). Evaluation in complex social settings is difficult, 
but the increasing encroachment of government into the 
minutiae of people’s lives deserves far greater justification 
than this evaluation provides.
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Notes
1. See www.humanservices.gov.au/customer/enablers/about-
basicscard#a4 for a full list of prohibited purchases.
2. See: https://www.dss.gov.au/families-and-children/
programmes-services/welfare-conditionality/cashless-
debit-card-trial-overview for details of participation in the
CDC trial.
3. There seems to be an error in the text on p13 of the Initial
Conditions Report (Orima, n.d.), which states that 24% of
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander residents in Kununurra
had a CDC while Fig 5 (that it refers to) on p14 shows the
percentage as 49%.
4. Hidden in an appendix on pB6 we find that 99%
of 548 participants in the evaluation were on the
compulsory program.
5. Whilst some guidance about statistical significance overall
is given on p14, the statistical significance of specific
results are rarely mentioned. Unless results are statistically
significant they may only result from random variations.
6. The frequency varied according to the density of people
at interview locations, but was never below every second
person (Orima 2017:12).
7. Alcohol restrictions came into effect on 15 September 2015
in Ceduna (Government of South Australia 2015). Various
alcohol restrictions have been in place since 2009 in the
East Kimberley (Department of Racing, Gambling and
Liquor n.d.), but an additional 12-month Takeaway Alcohol
Management System (TAMS) trial began in December 2015
(Codeswitch 2016).
8. See http://www.cbs.sa.gov.au/assets/files/NetGamblin
gRevenuegroupedbyLocalGovernmentArea(Council), for
2011/12–2015/16. For Ceduna, the Net Gambling Revenue
(NGR) per venue has dropped from $552 551 in 2011/12
to $444 444 in 2015/16, showing a clear downward trend,
despite a slight rise in 2014/15. A similar downward trend is
evident across the state (from $743 million to $719 million in
aggregate NGR per LGA over the same period).
9. See description of the trial at: https://www.dss.gov.au/
families-and-children/programmes-services/welfare-
conditionality/cashless-debit-card-trial-overview
10. The Orima (2017) evaluation does not provide a figure for 
the cost of the trial but information made public on 2 May 
2017 indicates that the trial is costing  $18.9m, 
approximately $10,000 per participant (Conifer 2017).
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